United Nations Command Repatriation Group


Page Contents


The Korean War would probably have ended much sooner if it had not been for the stalemate over the prisoner of war issue. The Communists wanted all prisoners of war returned, whether they wanted to be repatriated or not. Allied forces wanted all prisoners of war to have a free choice in whether or not they wanted to be repatriated. In 1953, the United Nations Command Repatriation Group (UNCREG) was formed to perform the important task of supervising repatriation efforts.  This page of the Korean War Educator is about those efforts, and is based on information and photographs supplied to the KWE by UNCREG veterans and their families.

More information and photographs are being sought for inclusion on this page of the Korean War Educator.  To submit your contribution to the UNCREG page, contact Lynnita Brown lynnita@koreanwar-educator.org.

(Click the picture for a larger view)

Robert Hennings (left) of Charleston, Illinois is pictured here with his close friend, Bartley J. Greenwood Jr. of Pensacola, Florida.  Greenwood, who was an observer with UNCREG in the "Observers Section, Korean", participated in an interview with Lynnita Brown for the Douglas County Museum’s oral history project, "The Korean War: Cold, Bloody, and Forgotten", in 1997.  His interview is owned by and housed in the Douglas County Museum, 700 S. Main St., Tuscola, Illinois 61953; ph. 217-253-2535.  The KWE is appreciative to both Bartley and the Douglas County Museum for allowing Information and pictures from his scrapbook to be posted on this page of the Korean War Educator.

Munsan-ni, Korea
1 September 1953 - 31 December 1953

A booklet by A. K. Hamblen

[KWE Note: The following text for "The UNCREG Story" was provided by Paul Wolfgeher of Independence, MO.
A pdf of the booklet can be viewed by Clicking HERE, courtesy of Joe Bush, nephew of Col. David Burman.]

Message from A. K. Hamblen, HQ, UNCREG:

We hope and pray that this is the last battle of the Korean conflict. If we can successfully establish the principle of non-forcible repatriation, it is our opinion that the enemy cannot afford to unleash another aggressive war in which he must depend upon the loyalty of slave soldiers to secure his aims. Consider the fact that of more than 20,000 Chinese prisoners of war, 15,000 have declared that they will forcibly resist repatriation. Three fourths of the so-called Chinese Peoples’ Volunteers have elected to remain on the side of the free world. We regard the choice of these prisoners as being indicative of the attitude of the entire Chinese people.

The essence of our endeavor will be to see that all of the men involved, on both sides, if they do reverse the stands they have taken, do so freely, with no duress, coercion, fear or intimidation. Our representatives will be alert to prevent any attempts on the part of the communist "explainers" to use unfair tactics, threats or reprisals on families, or any of the devices which are barred under the terms of the Armistice. Our own "explainers" representing the several UN nations involved in the Korean conflict have been instructed to conduct their explanations within the spirit and letter of the agreement.

In the event these prisoners remain loyal to the cause of the free world through the period of explanations by the communists, we feel that we will have won the psychological battle of our time. Such a victory for the free world would be an effective deterrent to the initiation of future aggressive wars by the communists.

- A.L. Hamblen, Brigadier General, USA Commanding

The United Nations Command Repatriation Group was organized to perform one of the most vital tasks still left undone in implementing the Armistice Agreement. After completion of the exchange of those prisoners who desired repatriation, explanations to 22,951 non-repatriate prisoners was the major remaining task to be accomplished. There were no textbooks or precedents to guide the UNC in this task.

On 24 September, the Custodian Forces, India, (CFI) completed taking custody of the non-repatriates when it received in its North Camp the 359 UNC non-repats from the Communist command. Two days earlier the United Nations Command completed its delivery of 7,890 North Korean and 14,702 Chinese prisoners to the South CFI camp.

Meanwhile, the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission (NNRC) was preparing rules for the conduct of explanations at both camps in the Demilitarized Zone.

Although the NNRC assumed custody of the prisoners of war on 24 September, explanations were not initiated until 15 October. This unexpected delay in the start of explanations came as a result of a last-minute protest by the Communists that the explanation sites built by the UNC engineers at the South Camp were inadequate and did not meet their specifications.

The Communists insisted that these specifications be met before any explanations would be made by their side. After several changes in NNRC construction requirements, the 32 new explanation points were rushed to completion and ready for explanations by midnight, 13 October.

While the hurried construction was being completed, the CFI was encountering trouble from the supposedly docile prisoners in the South Camp. The PWs, uncertain as to their ultimate fate, still lacked confidence in their Indian custodians. Due to the presence of Communist observers in the South Camp, the Chinese and North Korean non-repatriates demonstrated. These demonstrations created a number of touchy and difficult situations for the CFI. On two occasions the Indian guards fired into groups of demonstrating prisoners.

Lieutenant General K.S. Thimayya, the chairman of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, held his first press conference on 6 October with press representatives from both the UNC and the Communist camps. Facing an imposing battery of cameras, microphones, movie and TV equipment and correspondents, General Thimayya conducted the crowded conference with competence, tact and assurance.

Background to The UNCREG Story

(Click the picture for a larger view)

The truce talks at Panmunjom broke down in 1951 over the point of forced repatriation. The UN insisted that every prisoner be allowed to decide freely whether or not he was to return to his homeland.

After seemingly endless bickering and disappointment, on 27 July 1953, both sides finally agreed to a method of handling those prisoners who did not want to return to their homeland. The agreement was set forth in an annex to the Armistice Agreement called the Terms of Reference for the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission (NNRC). In this agreement each PW was guaranteed the right to elect his final disposition: he may decide to return to his original side, or he shall be aided in reaching a nation of his own selection.

The Terms of Reference provided for a commission composed of the representatives of five nations to oversee the prisoners not being directly repatriated. The neutral nations chosen to form the commission were Sweden, Switzerland, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and India. The representative from India was to be chairman and executive agent for the NNRC. India was also to provide a brigade of troops to guard the prisoners while they were being held in compounds within the Demilitarized Zone near Panmunjom.

Because of the refusal of the Republic of Korea to permit the Indian custodian troops to set foot on South Korean soil, the UNC carried the entire brigade to the Demilitarized Zone in one of the largest helicopter operations in military history. The Indian Custodian Force camp was named "Hind Nagar" meaning "Indian City" and the camp which housed the NNRC delegation was named "Shanti Nagar" meaning "City of Peace."

As set forth in the Armistice Agreement, all prisoners who indicated that they wanted to return to their homeland were to be repatriated within sixty days after the effective date of the Armistice. All prisoners who refused repatriation were then to be handed over to the custody of the NNRC. There, the nations to which the PWs belonged would have freedom to send representatives to explain their rights to the prisoners.

The Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command (CINCUNC), activated the United Nations Command Repatriation Group (UNCREG) on 1 September 1953 to deal specifically with the Terms of Reference for the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission. The activation of the United Nations Command Repatriation Group freed the United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission (UNCMAC) to deal specifically with the Armistice Agreement without dissipating its effort on the Terms of Reference.

Specifically, the mission of UNCREG was to insure that all PWs have the opportunity to exercise full freedom of choice, to insure that the efforts of the Communist explainers be not coercive, and to explain to the non-repatriate UNC prisoners their rights and their freedom of choice.

The Communists had already begun their tirade of unreasonable demands and accusations that were to continue throughout the entire operation. While the explanation sites were being constructed, they demanded that the 90-day explanation period be counted from the first day that the prisoners and the Communist explainers actually met in the tents at the explanation area. The UNC steadfastly opposed any extension of the explanation period beyond the termination date of 23 December as dictated by the Terms of Reference.

With three weeks already lost, time became an important factor for the Communists if they intended to persuade the thousands of anti-Communist prisoners to return to Communism. On the morning of 14 October, the Communist command requested that the NNRC deliver one thousand Chinese prisoners to the explanation sites for explanations on 15 October.

The prisoners, however, did not come out for explanations until they were assured by General Thimayya that they would not be segregated. Then 491 violent, rebellious prisoners received persuasion talks from the Communist explainers that first day. And more important, only ten of the total returned to Communist control. This small percentage of defectors, which was to set the pattern throughout the entire explanation period, must have come as a crushing blow to the Communists’ hopes of luring home their former troops.

More encouraging, but confusing to the Communists, must have been the occasional "bug outs." These PWs, who asked for repatriation before they were explained to, actually outnumbered the PWs whom the Communists were able to persuade to return to their homeland.

The next day the Communists were again able to stall explanations by requesting 1,000 Koreans instead of the Chinese who were willing to come to the explanation sessions. The Indian guards could find no means to get the prisoners to come out of their compounds, short of physical force and violence.

The third day, 17 October, was much the same as the first day. Although the Communists asked for 1,000 Chinese prisoners, they explained to only 430 of whom ten were repatriated. Again the Chinese prisoners were vocal in their condemnation of the communist explainers.

One of the major controversies of the explanation operations—should physical force be used to bring the prisoners to the explanation sessions—came as a result of these first three days of active explanations. The Communists demanded that the prisoners be dragged to the tents and forced to listen to extended sessions of intense grilling. The Swiss and Swede members of the NNRC insisted that such action would violate both the word and spirit of the Terms of Reference and the Geneva Convention.

Monday, 19 October, proved to be a repetition of the second day, as 1,000 Koreans were requested but couldn’t be induced to come out of their compounds. Although the Chinese non-repats actually expressed a desire to attend the explanations, the Communists persisted for Korean prisoners who would not leave their compounds.

By these tactics the Communists hoped to cause the NNRC to use force on the prisoners, which would create strife and bloodshed, and would possibly cause the Republic of Korea to take action against the Indians.

During this two-week lull in explanations, the NNRC was divided over the issue of forcing the prisoners to attend explanations. The Polish and Czech members demanded the use of force. The Swiss and Swede members were equally adamant in their stand opposing the use of force. So it was left to the Indian chairman to decide the issue, and he voted to support the Swede and Swiss view of "no force."

On the afternoon of 21 October, UNCREG received Corporal Edward S. Dickenson, the only American prisoner to change his mind during the explanation period. He was validated and returned to the UNC at the exchange point near the NNRC headquarters at Panmunjom in the Demilitarized Zone.

During the ninety-day period, a total of seven ROK prisoners voluntarily were repatriated. One of these defectors was a woman, the wife of another prisoner who also was repatriated. Husband, wife and their two small children returned to the UNC on 16 November.

The first mail from home to be received for the Americans in the North Camp was delivered on 24 October to the CFI, to be distributed to the individual prisoners. Spokesmen for the American non-repats complained that some of the letters were political and coercive in nature and requested that the NNRC censor their mail. The NNRC, thereafter, censored all mail before distributing it to the PWs.

Just when it appeared that the NNRC was hopelessly deadlocked over the issue of the use of force to make the non-repats attend explanations, General Thimayya announced that he had finally persuaded the Korean non-repatriates to come voluntarily to explanations.

When explanations were resumed on 31 October, the North Korean explainers had but little more success than their Chinese comrades. They were able to persuade only 21 out of 459 to return to Communism. And they were even less successful on the following day when they regained only 19 out of 483. It was now apparent that the Communists were "losing face" by continuing the explanations. Observers wondered what their next move would be.

The next day the Communists requested Chinese non-repats and immediately started a series of delaying tactics.  They prolonged each explanation session as long as the individual Indian chairman would permit. Some sessions lasted as long as four hours. But in spite of these "brain washing" tactics, they were able to lure back only 2 Chinese out of 205 on 4 November and 2 out of 136 on the following day.

The CFI did not separate prisoners who had already received explanations from those remaining in their compound. Realizing that the CFI would, therefore, be unable to determine which of the PWs in the compound had already received explanations, the Communists were again able to bring explanations to a complete standstill on 6 November by demanding the remainder of the compound to which they had been explaining the previous day.

The Communists persisted in this demand until 16 November at which time they asked for Korean non-repatriates. But when they were able to persuade only six out of 227 to return, they immediately brought explanations to a halt by again demanding to explain to the remainder of the compound on the following day. In this way they succeeded in bringing explanations in the South Camp to a standstill until 21 December.

It was on 2 December that the long awaited UNC explanations in the North Camp began with five Republic of Korea officers explaining to 30 South Korean non-repatriates. In decided contrast to the Communist sessions, the ROK "come home" talks were "brief, dignified, and to the point." From the first day it was apparent that the PWs were hand-picked by their Communist captors, and were well-versed in the doctrines of Communism.

Explanations to the South Koreans continued on a daily basis until 11 December at which time the PWs announced that they would no longer attend explanations. Surprisingly, their main complaint was that the explanation sessions were too short in that they were not given time to question the explainers on immaterial subjects or to make propaganda speeches.

With a week and a half still remaining of the 90-day period, the UNC asked to start explanations to the American Prisoners on 14 December. But the Americans, too, refused to come out of their compounds until the demands of the Korean non-repatriates were met. Therefore, the UNC made a daily request for whomever the CFI was able to produce: Americans, British or Koreans.

When it became apparent that the non-repatriate leaders in the North Camp would face explainers, UNCREG turned to other means to present the UNC position to the prisoners. Mimeographed statements of the free choice principle were submitted for approval by the NNRC for distribution to non-repats. When the NNRC ruled that the statements would have to be submitted to the prisoners under the conditions and procedures of a regular explanation, spokesmen for the PWs refused to accept them.

Meanwhile, in the South Camp, the Communists again started explanations. During the last three days of the 90-day period, they explained to 742 Chinese prisoners but were able to persuade only 69 of them to return to Communism.

On 23 December—the very last day of 90-day explanation period—the American, British and Korean non-repatriates still persisted in their refusal to attend explanation sessions. UNCREG, therefore, resorted to still anther means to fulfill its obligation top resent the UNC free choice principle to the prisoners. By means of a loudspeaker, an American, British, and Korean explainer each presented a brief statement to the non-repats assembled in the North Camp compound. The prisoners replied by singing the Communist "Internationale."

Throughout the entire 90-day period the Communists used every propaganda device at their disposal to present their endless tirade of protests, accusations and deceits. But they were able to coax back to Communism only a little more than one percent (1.14%) of the 22,604 prisoners in the South Camp. The overwhelming majority of the prisoners expressed their desire to go to South Korea or Formosa. A few asked to go to one of the neutral countries. At the same time over two percent (2.23%) of the supposedly hard-core Communists in the North Camp voluntarily returned to the United Nations side.

In his letter of appreciation to Brigadier General Hamblen on the successful completion of "Operation Freepatriate," General John E. Hull, Commander in Chief, United Nations Command, wrote:

"…it has been the major responsibility of the United Nations Command Repatriation Group to guide this critical undertaking in wisdom, restraint and discretion. On behalf of the entire United Nations Command, I wish to express my personal appreciation to you and your personnel for the manner in which your organization has fulfilled its mission. I am fully aware of the many difficulties which you have successfully overcome and it has been a source of deep satisfaction to me to observe the able, enthusiastic devotion to duty which has marked the performance of your group."


Overview of Personnel:

Long before the September birth of the United Nations Command Repatriation Group, thorough and far-reaching plans were being initiated to meet the Command’s complex makeup and critical need of qualified men.

Officers and enlisted men were selected by their military and civilian experience to fill duty positions in the various sections of UNCREG. Other qualified personnel were recruited from civilian and military sources throughout the Far East and the United States for critical vacancies in the sections.

The uniqueness of the mission of UNCREG required the formation of functional sections that had never existed before in Army history—Observer, Explainer and Representatives. Every section was organized to be highly flexible and adaptable to all situations that might occur.

At top strength, UNCREG’s personnel totaled almost 500, and was the largest command in Korea composed entirely of TDY personnel. Men came from the Korean Communications Zone, Prisoner of War Command, Eighth Army, Air Force, Navy and Marine units throughout Korea. Members representing the other United Nations were from the Republic of Korea, Great Britain, Australia, France, Canada, Greece, Belgium, Ethiopia, and Colombia. UNCREG was logistically supported by Headquarters support Group, UNCMAC, 8020th AU.

Office of the Commanding General:

The nerve center of the United Nations Command Repatriation Group was the Office of the commanding General. It was here that Brigadier General A.L. Hamblen, with his Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff, Colonel Ward S. Ryan, formulated the policies and decisions directing the UNCREG operations.

G2, G3 Section:

The mission of the G-2 and G-3 Section was to supervise and coordinate for the Commanding General all matters pertaining to organization, plans, operations and intelligence arising in connection with the important missions and operations of the United Nations Command Repatriation Group.

The Assistant G-2 was responsible for coordination and functions pertaining to military intelligence and counter-intelligence, through planning and execution of the collection, evaluation, interpretation and dissemination of information affecting the UNCREG mission.

The Assistant G-3 was responsible for all activities pertaining to communications, organization, plans and operations as applicable to the mission and operations of UNCREG.

Signal Section:

Working under the G-2, G-3 section, the Wireless Communication Section was assigned the responsibility of maintaining a rapid means of communication between the UNCREG observer and explainer teams in the Demilitarized Zone and UNCREG headquarters.

Three ton trucks were equipped with wireless radio equipment and were used as mobile units maintaining radio contact with the Signal headquarters. These mobile units had a transmitting radius of 30 miles.

Within 5 minutes a vital message from the observing or explaining teams could be in the hands of General Hamblen at UNCREG headquarters.

G-1 Section:

The G-1 Section served as an advisor to the Commanding General on all matters concerning management and assignment of UNCREG personnel.

Adjutant General Section:

The Adjutant General Section performed the administrative functions for the command. It maintained all officers’ and enlisted men’s records and submitted varied reports and personnel data upon official request. All UNCREG bulletins were published under AG supervision.

Because of the nature of its function, a night staff was maintained to provide round-the-clock service on administrative matters.

Public Information Section:

The PIO Section served as the advisor to the Commanding General and his staff on all matters pertaining to public information and relations. The PIO acted as the official spokesman for the Commanding General UNCREG.

It maintained a five-man escort team which accompanied convoys of UNC correspondents into the Demilitarized Zone. Facilities for radio and TV broadcasts as well as teletype accommodations were made available to the newsmen who were on hand to cover explanations to prisoners of war in the North and South Camps. The section began its operations on 7 September when Lt. Col. Ralph E. Pearson arrived from the Inchon Press Center to take over the duties of UNCREG’s Public Information Officer.

G-4 Section:

Essential to any military unit is the supply section, whose responsibility is the procurement and distribution of necessary equipment and supplies. Such items as food, clothing, office supplies, transportation, billets, etc., were the major concern of the men working in the UNCREG G-4 section.

Military History Section:

The mission of the Military History Section was the preparation of a systematic, objective and balanced account of the UNCREG operation.

Headquarters Commandant:

The Headquarters Commandant Section supported many of the operations of the other sections of the command. In its charge were the post security, messing facilities, billeting, post supply, clothing issue for all UNCREG troops and other miscellaneous UNCREG functions.

Headquarters Detachment:

The home unit of the enlisted men of UNCREG was the Headquarters Detachment. In addition to normal administrative matters, the Headquarters Detachment was responsible for the handling and delivery of mail to members of the command. With the exception of PIO personnel, all enlisted men of the command were billeted in the detachment area.

Explainer Section:

The basic purpose of the Terms of Reference was to permit explanations. Therefore the "explainer" played the dominant role in the operation. He had the important task of assuring that each prisoner was fully informed concerning his rights should he decide to be repatriated, to controvert lies and misleading information he had heard from the Communists, and generally to inform the prisoner concerning his full freedom to return home to a peaceful life.

Observer-Representative-Interpreter Section:

The Observer-Representative-Interpreter teams of UNCREG were present at all explanation sessions to Chinese and North Korean non-repatriates conducted by the Communist Command. Each team was composed of three men—an observer, a representative and an interpreter. In accordance with the Terms of Reference and the Rules of Procedure, one team attended each individual explanation session.

The duty of the observer was to insure that the explainer on the other side performed his functions in accord with the Terms of Reference and the Rules of Procedure, and to observe the general conduct of the explanations.

The representative functioned, in effect, as a defense counsel for the prisoner of war. He dealt with the Indian chairman of the NNRC subcommittee to insure that the Communist explainers did not coerce the prisoner, and to insure that the prisoner’s rights and interests were protected.

The interpreter translated the "persuasion talks" from Chinese or Korean to English for the presiding board of NNRC members.

UNCREG Personnel

Brigadier General A.L. Hamblen assumed command of the newly formed United Nations Command Repatriation Group on 1 September 1953. He assumed this duty in addition to his duties as Deputy Commanding General of the Korean Communications Zone. He was born in Maine and is a graduate of the University of Maine. He was commissioned a Second Lieutenant upon his entry into the Army in 1916. General Hamblen has attended the Infantry School Advance Course, the Command and General Staff School and the Army War College. Among the decorations held by General Hamblen are the Distinguished Service Medal, Legion of Merit, Bronze Star, the Commendation Ribbon, War Cross of Brazil, War Cross of Italy, the Crown of Italy, Legion of Honor, the Croix de Guerre of France and Commander British Empire.

Colonel Ward S. Ryan, Deputy Commander & Chief of Staff of UNCREG, was born in Montana. He entered the United States Military Academy at West Point in June, 1934 and was graduated with a Bachelor of Science degree on 13 June, 1938. Since then he has also attended the Infantry School at Fort Benning, Georgia, the Command and General Staff School and the Armed Forces Staff College. Colonel Ryan has been awarded the Silver Star, the Bronze Star with Oak Leaf Cluster, and the Commendation Ribbon. Before his assignment to UNCREG he was the Commanding Officer of the United Nations Command PW Camp #2 near Pusan.

The government booklet, "The UNCREG Story", includes pictures of UNCREG personnel. Although the pictures are not available to The Korean War Educator, a list of the personnel pictured in the booklet follows:

Brig. Gen. A.L. Hamblen (Commanding General), Col. Ward S. Ryan (Deputy Commander & Chief of Staff), Lt. Gen. K.S. Thimayya (Indian Chairman of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission), Lt. Col. Kak Kyun choi (explainer).

UNCREG HQ Staff: Col. Frederick Nagle, Col. Howard F. Bresee, Col. Williard B. Carlock, Lt. Col. Ralph E. Pearson, Lt. Col. Albert J. Meteny, Lt. Col. Edgar A. Noel, Cmdr Edgar H. Forrest, Lt. Col. Gustave E. Vitt, Major James L. Rankin Jr., Lt. Col. Alexander Kharitonoff, Major David Burman, Major Louis E. Williams, Major Edward A. Moorer, Major Charles E. Fogg, Major Charles Cornett.

1st Lt. James P. Scilley, Major Louis Williams, Capt. Roger L. Ranck, 2nd Lt. Robert R. Ruggiero, SFC B.E. Worford, Cpl. Alfonso Lucero, Pfc Richard A. Olek, Pfc Daniel J. DiPrince, Pfc Floyd D. Poland.

G-2, G-3 Section: Capt. Charles Stanton, Capt. Alfonso A. Castro, Capt. Edward G. Usher, Sgt. Alejandro Pardo-Acosta, Pfc. Henry Chiurazzi, Pvt. James R. Juntti, MSgt Floyd Galloway, Pfc Boyd Paxston, Pfc John A. Riley, Pfc. Richard A. Garr, Pfc James R. Monahan, Pfc Frank J. Milillo.

Signal Section: MSgt Thomas W. Muston, Pfc John A. Zakutney, Pvt James D. Whitney, Pvt Michael Penta, Pfce Edward F. Neill, Pvt. Leory Giles, Pvt Bennie B. Cook, Pvt Dayton F. Johnson, PFC Ted McKinney, Pvt George C. Gutierrez.

G-1 Section: MSgt Pebble V. Roberts, PFC Robert V. George, Major Charles Cornett, Cpl. John R. Falk, Pfc James T. Quinn, Pvt Marvin R. Wolber, PFC Jerald G. Haley, PFC James C. Riley, PFC Robert A. Carr.

Adjutant General Section: Pfc Stanely M. Magda, Pfc Joseph DePeters, Pvt Clifford Grabowski, Pvt William D. Gibson, Pfc Fred O. Marchbank, Pfc Ted W. Pathakis, PFC Kenneth O. McCormick, PFC Robert L. Penta, Pfc John Moravek, Cpl Francis L. Donahue, Jr., MSgt Dwaine A. Johnson, Sgt Adrian S. LaRose, Pfc Saul Rosen, 1st Lt. Francis C. Miles, Capt Paul Kohanik, 1st Lt William J. Burgett.

Public Information Section: Pfc Edward Nichols, Pfc William Kolman, Cpl R.J. Crispeno, Pfc Ronald Hertz, 2nd Lt Charles A. McNeill, SFC James F. Diggs, 2nd Lt Thomas Carroll, Lt Col. Ralph E. Pearson, Major Peter Erickson, 2nd Lt. Howard Erickson, Sfc Elmo Johnson, Pvt Elmer Goddard, Pvt Willie Maddox, Cpl I.B. Thompson, Pfc William J. Ladyka, 2nd Lt. Allan R. Wilhelm, 2nd Lt. William Homiak.

G-4 Section: Sfc Bernard J. Keting, 1st Lt. Charles E. Price, Sfc Albert P. Virtes, Pfc. John Nelson.

Headquarters Commandant: Sgt Charles Shimel Jr, SFC George Parks, CWO Geoffrey W. Tirrell, MSgt Paul J. Gray, Pfc Sherwood Faust, Pfc Joseph Cavestani, Pfc Al Cetrulo Jr, Pfc John J. Morawa, Pfc Carl Fritz, Pfc Edgar Leitao.

Headquarters Detachment: Pfc A.L. Tom, 1st Lt George T. Frohmader, MSgt Roger G. Bellemare, Pvt Robert L. Kost, Pfc Shung S. Low, Pvt Don R. Minogue, Pvt Larry R. Delaney, Pvt Bernard Boyle.

Military History Section: Pfc Edward Amerson, Cpl Jack Tykal, Maj. David Burman, Cpl Milton Hollingshead.

Explainer Section: Lt Col Kak Kyun Choi, Brig Gen Yoong Zoon Park, Major Edward a. Moorer, 1st Lt. Thomas Singleton, Capt. Chester F. Hockeborn, 2nd Lt Edward L. Pinney, Major John Bojus, Major Desmond F. Ryan, Lt. Col Ha Sun Yun, Major Jin Gu Kim, 1st Lt Leslie A. Palmer, Major Dong Sik Kim, Major Kwi Su Kim, Major Woo Jin Sun, 1st Lt James O. Day, 2nd Lt James J. Riker, 2nd Lt. Lambert Asselberghs, DAC Shao Chyan Yang, 1st Lt Robert N. Spitzer, 1st Lt Boris Pogoloff, 1st Lt Karl F. Lange, 1st Lt. Jose Bibiloni, 1st Lt. Fletcher A. Aleong.

Explainer Section, Enlisted Personnel: Pfc W.W. Miller, Pvt W.J. Chico, Jr., Cpl. R.P. Crumb, MSgt H.A. Stevenson, Sfc F.A. McAlister.

Headquarters Observers: 2nd Lt James L. Anderson, Col. Willard B. Carlock, Col Howard L. Bresee, Major D. Ryan, Capt Tafesse Lemma, MSgt Foster N. Berry, DAC Roy C. Kim, DAC Robert H. Chee, DAC Chen Yih, Pvt. David L. Stephens, Pfc Joseph J. Milewski, Pfc William M. Stelter, Pfc Gerald Slotnick, Sfc Lawson E. Archer, Pfc Jesse Parker, MSgt Raymond B. Petroski, 1st Lt Harry M. Flower.

Observers Section, Chinese, Teams 1-8: Lt Col Ben M. Faribault, Lt Col V.F. Meisling, Maj Carret F.W. Kersbergen, Cmdr Carl Klein, Major C.K. Wong, DAC Chung Yean Kao, DAC Yuan Chang, Lt Col Phillip H. Hill, DAC Chen The Hsu, DAC Joe Yuen Jeong, Pfc Ngoon N. Tom, DAC Norman L. Lyon, Major Mario C. Dimseng, Major Gabriel S. Calingo, Capt. William B. Carpenter, DAC Chich Wang, Pfc Way S. Lee, DAC Chung En Huang, Pfc Calvin S.K. Wong, Maj. Charles H. Fogg, lst Lt Robert E. Kelly.

Observers Section, Chinese, Teams 9-16: Capt David E. Pihl, Major William Fox, Lt Col Guy B. Wilder, Major John Kiernan Jr, Major George V. Lane, 1st Lt Robert S. Munroe, DAC Robert Yang, Capt Donald J. McDevitt, DAC Eugene Chang, DAC Ching Chong His, DAC Frank L. Ke, DAC James P. H. Fan, DAC Richard W. Lee, DAC Sui Seng Na, DAC George Yen, Pvt Nay C. Toy, Pvt David K. W. Moy, DAC Loyd Tenaka, Pvt Paul G. Woo, DAC Jon Nicholas, 2d Lt Charles J. Kelly, DAC Francis Lee, DAC Chisiang Chien, Pvt Nelson Leong, Pfc Samuel L. Jeung.

Observers Section, Chinese, Teams 17-24: 1st Lt Richard F. Jordan, Lt Col Albert L. Seeger, Cpt Charles H. Jackson, 2nd Lt David C. Rosenberg, DAC David Tsao, Pvt Kwok T. Tom, DAC Phillip Lee, DAC Yi Hung Fang, Pvt Bow Lou, DAC Shao Chyan Yang, DAC Kang Chao, DAC Chun Ming Ying, Capt Wendell W. Long, DAC Hung Ku, Cpt Lindle Hancock, DAC Kwang Tsun Wei, DAC Ching Fung Kwang, DAC Raymond B. May, DAC Wilford Woo, Cpt Howard A. Gagnon, Cpl James S. Bard, DAC Shih Chun Peng, Pvt Phillip Hom.

Observers Section, Chinese, Teams 25-32: 1st Lt Richard F. Edwards, Cpt Donald G. Stettler, Cpt Harold J. Treace, Lt Col Raymond C. Woodes, Sr Lt Lichel Didisheim, Pfc Stephen W. Yee, DAC Watson Lee, DAC Leonard F. Bau, DAC Haven Chiang, DAC Charles Joe, DAC Shu Len Ksiao, Pvt Gum C. Lee, Pvt Wang Hai Dwo, Pvt Clayton J. Brock, DAC George Chang, DAC Frank Yue, DAC Shelley H. Cheng, DAC Tien Si Lee, Pfc Don Finney, DAC James B. Gibson, 1st Lt Harry Flower, 2nd Lt Glen Cannon.

Observers Section, Chinese, Teams 33-40: Cpt F.J. Hagerty, Cpt Carl Smith, Cpt Robert D. Geer, 2d Lt Kurt Weinke, 2d Lt James Anderson, Pfc Charles Sung, Pfc Hen M. Yee, Pvt James Jewik, Pfc Youe F. Hum, Pvt James M. Yee, CMS Jee Chong Sup, Pvt William Leong, Pvt Chong D. Koo, Pvt Ching Yuk, Cpl David C. Leong, Pvt Victor Ng, Pvt Ken Bing Hom, Pvt Raymond Mow, Pfc Tong Tze Yuen, lst Lt Joseph T. Cooke, Pvt James M. Chiao, Pfc Jacob Young, DAC Lee Chin Chuan, Pfc David T. Wu, Cpl Wing Fong, S/Sgt David S. Corbett, 1st Lt Patrick O’Shere, Pfc Louis G. Moon, A/lc Noel L. Pannin, 2d Lt Henry M.H. Leong.

Observers Section, Korean, Teams 1-8: Lt Col William R. Robinette, Lt Col Joseph L. Macsalka, Major Kenneth Hicks Jr, Major Duane C. Tway, CMS Yun Too Yung, CMS Lee Bom II, DAC Yoon Too Kang, Capt Ko Chung Ky, 1st Lt Kim Ke Hoon, 1st Lt Jong Hae Hon, 1st Lt Kim Young Ho, 1st Lt Koh Kyong Shik, 1st Lt Lee Duk Woo, Capt Jeung Dong Sah, Capt Bartley J. Greenwood Jr, 1st Lt William J. Alexander, 2d Lt Leonard Gaskins, Capt Hugh S. McChesney, 1st Lt Woo Doo Jae, CMS Sin Huon Kak, CMS Lee Tong Soo, Capt Choi Yong Chun, 1st Lt Choi Byung Hak.

Observers Section, Korean, Teams 9-16: Major Duane C. Tway, Cpt Lee Chang Hee, Major Clarence W. Ellis Jr., 1st Lt Kwon Sung Jin, 1st Lt Chang Won Yong, Capt Angel L. Carlo, 1st Lt Sung Nak Chil, Capt Yang M. Jeon, 1st Lt. Seu Kwang Wook, CMS Hae Hong, CMS Tong Ik Chang, Capt Dong Young Kim, CMS Oon Ki Pak, 1st Lt Cho Yang Hwi, Capt Lee Yoon Oh, Capt Robert E. Whitney, DAC Chang S. Yeun, Capt Harry A. Diehl, Capt Robert R. Scott, Capt Alfred Phillips, 1st Lt Kim Dal Sik, Capt Alfred L. Cler.

Observers Section, Korean, Teams 17-24: CMS Choi Bong Ho, Capt John K. Hyun, Lt Col A.F. Bruno, 2nd Lt Walter Harvey, 2d Lt John J. Burnett, Jr., 1st Lt Kim Dae Hwa, 1st Lt Donald McNamara, Myong Che Chon, Pek Hak II, Capt Kim Kyang Sup, 1st Lt Lee In Shik, 1st Lt Bioum Bo Cook, 1st Lt Sim J. Young, Jeung Ui Hwan, 1st Lt Philip Sheridan, Lu Keng Soong, 1st Lt William A. Phillips, Park Young Sik, 2d Lt Murray I Braumann, Capt Han Shick Moon, 1st Lt Ernest B. Johson.

Observers Section, Korean, Teams 25-32: Maj O.L. Jordan, Lt Col Schiller Shore, Lt Col Raymond E. Klein, Capt Andrew Hjelmstrom, Capt Robert B. Hill, 1st Lt Ji Kyng Duk, Capt Chung Dae Shick, 1st Lt Lee Woo Yun, 1st Lt Lee Hong Woo, 1st Lt. Kim Kyang Hwan, 1st Lt Choi Cung Chaeol, CMS Kang Hea Kyung, 1st Lt. Koo Ja Wook, DAC Choi Chang Ho, DAC Kim Sang Dong, 1st Lt. Kim Ki Yoon, 1st Lt Kim Kim Suk Bae, 1st Lt George W. Sears, 2nd Lt Arthur Culberson Jr., 1st Lt Albert L. Kimball, CMS Chong Do Bu.

Observers Section, Korea, Teams 33-40: 2d Lt James T. Gordon, Capt Eugene B. Legaspi, Capt Peter D. Sacco, 2d Lt John J. Valletta, DAC Roy CI Kim, 1st Lt Kim Hung Doo, 1st Lt Lee En Ran, 1st Lt Lim Han Soon, 1st Lt Lee Tong Ho, 1st Lt Kim Kyo Sik, 1st Lt Keung Ki Chang, CMS Kim Se Chun, 1st Lt Son Jae Jo, CMS Lim Chong Kook, CMS Kang Yun Kyang, 1st Lt Ka Jae Nam, 1st Lt Moon Kum Suong, 1st Lt Lee Byung Hak, 1st Lt Geum Kongh, 1st Lt Lee Hung Kun, 1st Lt Park, CMS Lee Byong Seng.

The following articles of information about UNCREG came from the Korean War scrapbook of Bartley J. Greenwood of Pensacola, Florida. He loaned the material and pictures to the Korean War Educator in order to inform the general public about the important role that UNCREG played in the Korean War and world history. The information below represents material that was distributed to UNCREG staff, including an orientation speech, flyer text, regulations on dealing with prisoners, a key to violations, questions asked on debriefing forms, and newspaper articles.



Gentlemen, we welcome you with great pleasure to PW Command where you will spend the next several days with the anti-Communist prisoners of war. The Command is extremely interested in your mission and will give you all possible assistance to make it successful. For the next few minutes I wish to orient you on what you can expect to find when you go to the camps. It is possible that some of what I have to say has already been told to you at your school, but it is important enough to be emphasized through repetition.


First as to your mission. Your general mission you know. Here in the command your mission will be to acquaint yourselves with the prisoners. Learn how they live, what they think and talk about, and what their hopes and fears are. You will find that they are different from most men that you have known. Years behind wire can create changes in the psychological make-up of most men, be they peasants or scholars. You must make it your business to understand them. Do not brush off their fears and actions as childish. They are very real to the prisoners. Remember you are to champion these people, protect them against coercion, and stand up for their rights. You must dedicate yourself to this task without compunction.


From here you will be sent out to the camps. In the Command there are three camps containing Korean prisoners and two having Chinese prisoners. Camp 1 on Koje-do has one compound of 568 Korean prisoners who have declared they will not be repatriated. At camp 2 in Pusan, there are seven compounds with about 3300 Koreans and one compound with about 450 Chinese. At Camp 3 on Cheju-do there are 30 compounds with over 14,000 Chinese, and at Camp 6 at Nonsan there are 8 compounds with over 4000 Koreans. The general arrangement of the camps is a series of enclosures, each enclosure having an average of 8 compounds. Each compound holds about 500 men. You will become familiar with the physical set up after your orientation by the camp commanders. Also, at each camp you will find a CI&E detachment which is in charge of the education information, agriculture, and recreation programs. In as much as the work they have been doing for the prisoners has been of assistance in relieving the boredom of imprisonment, you will find that the prisoners are favorably inclined toward the CI&E program. You will find that personnel can be of great assistance to you in your work. Look to them for guidance and assistance.

You will be urged to mingle with the prisoners. If time allows, you may be transferred to other camps in order to help you get to know as many prisoners as possible. Learn their routine and identify yourselves with them. Set an example of exemplary behavior. Recognize the fact, and let them know you recognize it, that they are more than just prisoners of war—they are a special group of individuals who are the physical embodiment of the great principle of non-forcible repatriation and political asylum.


The thoughts and fears of the prisoners will be evidenced in the questions they will ask you. Here are a few typical ones: Where are we going? When? Why? How? What protection shall we have? What will the NNRC do to us? Can we go to Taiwan? To South Korea? And so on. In practically every case those questions have been answered for them. They will ask them of you for corroboration, reassurance, or even to test your knowledge of your job. Never underrate them. These prisoners are smart in many ways. For example, the prisoners themselves are more proficient in the terms of reference than are their teachers. So do not brush off their questions. Give truthful, factual answers. Don’t guess. If you don’t know the answer, find out. I will give you the source of many of the answers in a few minutes. Assist the PW in every way you can, but don’t let them use you as message carriers, go-betweens, or buffers against camp discipline.

You will find that there are several classes of anti-Communists. Some are genuinely anti-Communistic, even fanatically so. Many are lukewarm, some are undecided, and some don’t give a damn for any political philosophy. At this late stage we can only treat them all alike. Within our power we are doing everything possible to reassure them and strengthen their resistance against Communist blandishments.

But they have fears. The Koreans fear that the process set up for them is too long and that they can do better for themselves by refusing to go through with the program and trying to escape now. They do not realize that they have been promised citizenship only if they go through the program. The Chinese on the other hand, are determined to go through with the program, but they enter it as martyrs, having little faith in the promises of all the world governments, including Taiwan, that they will be secure in their new camps. They fear the Indians; they fear that Communists will raid their camp; they fear that you as their representatives will not be smart enough to cope with the Communist tricks; and they fear that they themselves will succumb to the arguments of the Communist explainers. Your job and our job is to allay those fears and make them realize that only their patience, courage, and faith can the program be made to work. In this connection you can win their faith and confidence by looking out for their welfare, especially during the movement to and stay in the Neutral Zone camp. Look after their rights, and call attention of the authorities to all reasonable requests.


The basic sources of information which contain the answers to almost all of the questions which you might be called on to answer are these publications:

  • Pamphlet No. 1
  • Terms of Reference
  • Armistice Agreement
  • Geneva Convention
  • CI&E Newscasts
  • CI&E Leaflets
  • Camp Regulations

Korean Language

Target: Non-Repatriated PWs in UN PW Camps

(Click picture for a larger view)

(Click picture for a larger view)

This leaflet was designed by 1st Radio Broadcasting & Leaflet Group to relate to the PWs the location of the camp that they will go to in the neutral zone and what type of transportation they will have to get there. Text translated from Korean original. Artwork: front – illustration of map of Korea, 2 trains, and demilitarized zone. Back – text only. Markings – Pusan, Nonsan, Yong Dong Po, Seoul, Rhee Camp, 38th Parallel, and Demilitarized Zone.



A. The armistice agreement has been signed, you all know that on 23 January you will become a member of the free world.

B. A demilitarized neutral zone has been established, fighting personnel of both sides have all been withdrawn, and members of the Neutral Nations Commission are continuously arriving.

C. Upon the specific request of President Syngman Rhee, you will be moved, before 25 September, to a new location in the neutral zone. The map on the back indicates the route of your movement.

1. You will go by train to your new camp site in the neutral zone.

D. You must be particularly aware that the UN Command with its firm stand will never turn you over to the communists against your will.

E. The security inside your new camp area will be protected by soldiers from India, with British-trained officers. But U.S. troops will be close by to protect your security, and continue to give you food, clothes and medical care.

F. In another 90-day period, Communist explainers will come to interview you and try to convince you to return to North Korea by making promises which will be disregarded later. But the UN Command representatives—who will be Republic of Korea Army officers who speak both Korean and English—and the Indian, Swedish and Swiss representatives will be present to see that no threat of force is employed against you. At the end of this 90 days, the Communist explainers will have to go back to North Korea.

G. Since you have determination to be a member of the free world, you should let these 90 days go by with patience.

H. At the end of this 90 days, a political conference of 30 days will be held, which will study all of your particular wants, desires, as well as your future. The United States will protect your interests in the conference.

I. At the end of this 30 days, all of you who courageously resisted communist lies will return to civilian status and be set free in South Korea, where President Rhee has assured you of a happy and honorable reception.



Any act of force or threat of force to prevent or to effect repatriation of prisoners of war is prohibited.

No prisoner of war shall commit an act of violence against another prisoner of war.

Any action infringing upon the rights of prisoners of war under Terms of Reference of the Commission is prohibited.

Any acts of prisoners of war which have the effect of derogating from or obstructing the authority of the Commission to exercise its legitimate functions and responsibilities is prohibited.

Any act on the part of prisoners of war impeding the work of EXPLANATIONS & INTERVIEWS is prohibited.

As soon as the custody of prisoners of war has been assumed by the NNRC, through the Custodian Force, India, the Commission shall ensure that the prisoners of war are acquainted with the provisions contained in the preceding paragraphs 1-5.

Explanations and interviews can be given to groups of or individual prisoners of war as requested by the explaining representatives of the nation to which the prisoners of war belong. Everyone of the prisoners of war shall attend the explanations and interviews.

Several explanations and interviews to the same group of prisoners of war or the same individual prisoner are permissible within the time prescribed in Article 8 of the Terms of Reference of the Commission.

Prisoners may apply for repatriation at any time and at any place. The NNRC will ensure that every prisoner of war has opportunity to do so without any fear.

At the time of the explanation, there shall be present the NNRC or its subordinate body, along with one representative each of the two sides to observe the operation and one representative of the detaining side.

A sufficient number of subordinate bodies not exceeding 35, composed of one representative from each member nation on the NNRC shall be established to attend all the work of explanations and interviews and to determine the validity of applications for repatriation.

The explaining representatives shall have the right to distribute to the prisoners of war written explanations in accordance with the provisions of Article 8 of the Terms of Reference having duly been examined by the Commission or its subordinate body.

At no time during the explanations and interviews shall the observer of either side be permitted to interfere with the work of explanation, the sole function being to observe.

The representative of the detaining side shall not participate in the work of explanation or interfere with it in any way. He may, however, bring to the notice of the Chairman of the NNRC or its subordinate body at the end of each explanatory session, any matter which may be construed as violating the Terms of Reference.

In the process of explanations and interviews, interpretation to NNRC. Representative present shall, without obstructing the work of explanations and interviews, be concurrent and shall not interrupt the explanation and interview work.

The explaining representatives may ask the prisoner of war any relevant questions provided the latter is warned of his right that he need not answer the questions if he thinks or the NNRC or its subordinate body thinks that the answer to the questions may be used to threaten or coerce him directly or indirectly.

If in the opinion of a member of a subordinate body, in charge of the supervision of explanations, an explainer infringes upon the Terms of Reference or present rules, or also in any case of disturbance or any major incident, the session shall be immediately suspended; the subordinate body will then without delay examine the situation brought about by such an incident and state upon the conditions under which the session shall be resumed and/or report the case to the Commission.


18. The sites for explanations and interviews, whether to individuals or to groups, shall be so constructed as to ensure that the work of explanations and interviews be free from any interference or obstruction.

Facilities shall also be provided for the conduct of the work of explanations and interviews to sick, wounded and injured prisoners of war.

Prisoners who have applied for repatriation, those who have been given explanation, but have not submitted their applications for repatriation and those who have neither been given explanation nor applied for repatriation should be kept separated in custody.

Each enclosure for the conduct of individual or group explanations shall have two exists to be used separately by the prisoners of war; one for those who apply for repatriation and the other for those who do not.

The work of explanation shall be carried out each day of the week, except Sundays, from 0730 hours to 1630 hours with a lunch interval of one hour.

The explaining representatives of the nations to which the prisoners of war belong shall forward to the Secretariat of the NNRC plans one day in advance from day to day regarding the method of explaining work. They should reach the Secretariat not later than 1000 hours on the day previous to the date on which the plan is to be put into operation.


  • 1. Freedom of PW denied to make representations to NNRC.
  • Insults and abusive language directed toward UNC representatives.
  • No explanations while prisoner of war questions legality.
  • Insults and abusive language directed toward free world nations and institutions.
  • Communist observers may not interfere nor exert influence.
  • All five NNRC nations and representatives from detaining side must be present during explanations.
  • Authorized explainers only may explain.
  • Explanations in presence of NNRC.
  • Mention of strength or location of communist forces intimidates PW.
  • Allegations of communist military victories intimidates PW.
  • Threatening gestures, bombast intimidates PW.
  • Threats of reprisal against prisoner or prisoner’s family intimidates PW.
  • Use of fraudulent messages from prisoner’s family intimidates PW.
  • Injection of sex angle is "affront to dignity or self-respect".
  • Use of improper terms in explaining is "affront to dignity or self-respect."
  • Offer of bribes is "affront to dignity or self-respect."
  • Women entertainers in camp is "affront to dignity or self-respect."
  • Extended distasteful explanations about communism are inhumane.
  • Right of prisoner to medical treatment.
  • No explanation to ill prisoners.
  • geneva Convention limits hours of work.
  • Prisoners entitled to one day off per week.
  • No communist explainers in compounds except during supervised explanations.
  • Right of prisoner to exercise religious duties.
  • Explainer oversteps role defined in Terms of Reference.
  • Explainer exceeds bounds of interrogation.
  • Communist explainers may not ask PWs name.
  • No photographs of prisoner against his will.
  • Prisoner must be given time for reflection.
  • CFI compels all prisoners of war to attend communist explanation (either at their own compound or at a special explanation compound).
  • Prisoners of war are compelled to attend more than one explanation without their consent.
  • Communist explainers outnumber UNC representatives.
  • Communist representatives attempt to distribute written explanations.
  • Communist representatives attempt to distribute written explanation not previously submitted to UNC representatives.
  • Interpretation of explanations is not concurrent, but is accomplished at considerable time interval after the phase to which it pertains.
  • Communist explaining representative demands an answer to his question from prisoner of war without prisoner being adequately warned of his rights by NNRC.



  • NNRC
    • Was full sub-committee present?
      • Number & names of persons by nationality and sex
  • EXPLAINER (Communist)
    • Nationality and sex
  • OBSERVER(S) (Communist)
    • Number, nationality and sex
  • INTERPRETERS (Communist)
    • Number, nationality and sex
    • Observer (Grade, Name & Service)
    • Representative (Grade, Name & Service)
    • Grade, Name & Service
  • OTHERS (exclusive of PW)
  • PW(S) present (list nationality and number present)
    • Is this the first time PW was interviewed? If not, how many previous interviews?
    • Tactics
    • Were any matters forward to Senior NNRC group for decision? Be specific.
    • Was sub-committee impartial in its decisions or general demeanor?
    • Nature of debates between sub-committee members.
    • Were Swiss and/or Swedish members of sub-committees as forceful in conduct of their argument(s) as Czech-Polish members?
    • Indian Chairman of sub-committee
      • Deliberate in his voting?
      • Apparently cast votes with little thought to nature of issue?
      • Appear biased either way, in speech or voting?
      • How many issues were decided by his (Chairman’s) vote alone?
      • Nature of issues settled by voting of sub-committee (be specific).


Lee Duk Woo to Mrs. Bartley Greenwood
23 October 1953

Dear Mrs. Greenwood

(Click the picture for a larger view)

I think your husband, Captain Greenwood, have written you about me already. I am Lt. Lee Duk Woo, your husband’s poor partner in certain job here in Munsan, but it is about two month since I met him on Koje-do.

I am very glad that I could meet a U.S. officer like him, because as a still young man, I have many things to learn about human life, and I think I can learn many things from him. Among so many officers here, he is the only officer I could find who has deep feeling of humor and understanding of humanity.

I was very anxious when he caught a bad cold and laid on bed for two days, and I felt very grateful to him when I see him spending hard time in different circumstance and longing for home being so far from home. Suppose I am longing to see my wife even when she is only 26 miles from me and I can see her every weekend.

And I have deep respect for U.S. Army’s families who are supporting their husbands mentally and bearing all the sufferings they might have. This is not only my personnel feeling for the United States and her people but all the Koreans are very grateful to them.

I hope someday Korea become very good country and can help you to whom Korea owe very much. And I wish you can manage very happy life, healthy and wealthy with your husband very soon.

– Yours very sincerity, Lee Duk Woo


MUNSAN, Sept. 9 (UP)

Members of the U.N. and ROK explaining team were arriving in Munsan today faced with the task of convincing reluctant PWs they have been victimized by the Reds.

Brig. Gen. Archelaus Hamblen, who heads the group, said he hoped to begin interviewing balky American, British, and South Korean prisoners on or about Sept. 25.

"I HOPE TO DO what we can to protect the Chinese and North Korean non-repatriates; to explain to the reluctant U.N. non-repatriates their rights and to insure that the terms of the armistice are carried out in those respects," Hamblen said. At the same time an Army spokesman said that at least 30 "explainers" would be assigned to the jobs of undoing the results of the "brainwashing" which turned the men against their native countries.

The terms of the armistice allow a maximum of seven "explainers" for every thousand PWs held. Since the vast majority of the reluctant Allied PWs are South Korean, the spokesman explained, at least five of the U.N. "explainers" will be ROK Army officers.

"WE ARE LETTING the ROK Army officers handle their own work," the spokesman said. "We will take them to the South Korean PWs, but it will be their show from there on out." The ROK officers, along with the team of American "explainers," have undergone an intensive training course at Taegu in preparation for their task. All of the officers were hand-picked from units throughout the Eighth Army in Korea. Each side must have completed "explanations" to the PWs within 90 days. Those remaining in the custody of the Indians after that time will have their fate decided by the post-armistice political conference.

IF THE CONFERENCE cannot decide the issue within 30 days more, the PWs will become civilians and will be assisted by the neutral rations’ repatriation commission to take up residence in neutral nations. At least 11o observers will be assigned the task of keeping an eye on the tactics employed by Communist "explainers" in their dealings with the reluctant North Korean and Chinese PWs, who have refused to go home.
It is expected that members of the press will be allowed to witness some of the "explanations" by either side. So far, the Military Armistice Commission has been unable to agree to procedures for press coverage within the Indian camp.

General’s Bravery Saves Indian Major Held as Hostage by Angry Chinese
By William Miller
MUNSAN, Sept. 26 (UP)

A brave Indian major general single-handedly put down a riot by hundreds of frenzied anti-Communist Chinese prisoners Friday and rescued two of his troops the PWs had taken captive, it was revealed today. Hero of the prisoner uprising was Major Gen. S.P. Thorat, commanding general of the Indian forces who stalked unarmed into the swirling PW compound and talked the surly prisoners into obedience. The riot by some 500 anti-Red Chinese occurred about noon in protest over the return to the Communists Friday of another PW who asked to be sent back to the Reds.

SEVERAL INDIAN guards were injured slightly by stones and by tent poles wielded by the rioting Chinese. Thorat was uninjured. The custodial troop commander, at the risk of his own life and against the wishes of his officers, fought his way into the compound. "What sort of Chinese are you," he bellowed at the nearest Chinese. "Where is your hospitality? You have neither offered my men tea nor cigarettes." The Chinese were stunned by Thorat’s unexpected move. Their anger melted and they dropped their makeshift weapons. They brought tea and cigarettes for Thorat and 12 men who followed him into the compound.

THEN THEY released their two hostages and the riot was over. Thorat was in the compound about an hour and a half during which time some 22,000 prisoners in other stockades threatened to break out of their enclosures and attack the Indian guards who stood by with rifles at the ready. The incident built up gradually throughout the morning, with the Chinese prisoners pelting Indian guards with stones. Thorat, making his morning rounds with Brig. Gurbakah Singh, Lt. Daljit Singh and Maj. H.S. Grewal, went inside the compound despite warnings that the prisoners were in an ugly mood.

THE CHINESE at first refused to talk with the officers and then demanded the return of the repatriated prisoner. Thorat refused. After 20 minutes’ discussion the general turned and led his men from the compound. At that, the prisoners grabbed Grewal and Daljit Singh, who were in the rear. The lieutenant tore himself away from the grasping Chinese, but Grewal was taken captive. Lance Cpl. Thakur Singh saw the Chinese dragging Grewal into a tent and rushed to his recue. He also was taken prisoner.

Thorat immediately went back into the stockade, ignoring Gurbakah, the brigadier’s protests. "I want to take the bull by the horns and assess the situation for myself," Thorat said. The brigadier hastily ordered 12 men of the crack Indian JAT Regiment to follow Thorat into the compound, and the angry Chinese attacked the custodial troops with tent poles, injuring several slightly. It was then that Thorat came up with his startling psychological move that stunned the Chinese into submission.

AFTER WHAT an Indian spokesman described as a "lengthy and polite" discussion, the major and the lance corporal were released. The Chinese prisoners then conferred again and decided tow rite a formal application to the Neutral Nations’ Repatriation Commission for the return of the repatriated prisoners. As Thorat left the stockade, he was escorted by a guard of honor provided by the Chinese in recognition of his bravery.

INDIAN VILLAGE, Korea, Sept. 28 (AP)

American Army helicopters today began shuttling more Indian troops from a U.s. aircraft carrier off Inchon to the Indian-guarded prisoner camps in the demilitarized zone. The Indian contingent totaled about 1,000 troops. Still to come within a few days are an additional 600 reinforcements.



An Indian spokesman for the Neutral Nations’ Repatriation Commission today stated that persuader teams would have the right to talk to balky war captives alone, if desired, in an effort to convince them to accept repatriation. The decision of the Neutral Nations’ Repatriation Commission, as reported by the Indian spokesman, a colonel, was a victory for the Communists who demanded the right to interview North Korean prisoners individually. The U.N. opposed the ruling.

MUNSAN, Sept. 28 (INS)

A Communist demand for the right to question some unrepatriated prisoners individually will be answered at Panmunjom today by the Neutral Nations’ Repatriation Commission. It is the last of the number of problems which caused delay until Oct. 1 of the start of a 90-day "explanation" period in which both sides can make efforts to get the prisoners to change their minds about refusing repatriation. The ------- [unreadable] ing of prisoners individually on the ground it would give the Reds an opportunity to intimidate the captives.

DECISIONS on other problems, reached by the repatriation commission yesterday, included: 1) Explanations will take place six days a week, eight hours a day, except that toward the end of the 90-day period seven-day sessions will be permitted if requested by either side (2) The explaining side will determine size of the groups to be interviewed down to as small as two men (unless the Red demand for individual questioning is granted). The Allies have indicated they will make explanations to groups of about 20 to 25 men. (3) Explainers will not be separated from the prisoners by barbed wire but armed guards will be present to prevent trouble. Threats of any kind will not be permitted. (4) Indian custodial troops may employ "minimum force" to compel prisoners to attend explanations. They could carry a prisoner bodily to the place of explanation but could not force him to listen. (5) The Communists must expand their explanation enclosures from the present 15-by-9 foot space to a more workable size.

Meanwhile, the Communists gave an indication yesterday of things to come, AP reported. They received 65 Chinese captives from the Indians. The Chinese "changed their minds" after originally saying they did not want to go home.

MUNSAN, Korea 18 (UP)

The U.N. protested yesterday that 116 unauthorized Communists entered the prisoner explanation area, some with passes handed them through the fence by Communists already inside. Brig. Gen. A.L. Hamblen, senior U.N. repatriation officer, said a military police count showed 356 Communists entered the restricted "counter brainwashing" zone Friday but only 240 were authorized. Hamblen made the formal protest in a letter to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission.

SEATTLE, Wash., Dec. 25 (UP)

Mrs. Portia Howe, homeward bound for Christmas, yesterday disclosed arrogant Communist boasts that her turncoat son would return to his homeland in about three years as a conquering Red hero.

Mrs. Howe, who said her war prisoner son had "disgraced himself," said she would make no more overtures toward him but would take him back if he ever chooses to return. She revealed she had received literature from the Communists. Mrs. Howe said one dispatch told her to "stop worrying about your son."

"We (the Communists) will be in command in about three years and you will see your son then," she quoted the literature.

By John Randolph
INDIAN VILLAGE, Korea, Nov. 2 (AP)

(Click the picture for a larger view)

The tall, slender Communist lieutenant stood up, placed his fingers on a small green field table, and leaned forward toward the struggling North Korean prisoner. "Tung-moo (Korean for comrade)….," he began….. The word was like a whip across the prisoner’s face. "Tung-moo," he screamed and hurled himself forward against the lean brown arms of his Indian guards. "Tung-moo! You filthy sons of a dog….You Dirty Communist trainer….You and your Russian Chinese barbarians…Don’t ‘comrade’ me, you dirty Chinese lover…I spit on your father and your mother!". And he spat straight at the young officer only 5 feet away. It missed his face, but soiled the crisp olive-green uniform coat, with its gleaming Sam Browne belt and gold and scarlet shoulder boards.

COMMUNIST REMAINS UNRUFFLED. The young Communist stood quietly erect, not moving, not speaking, as the prisoner writhed and stomped and kicked to break from his Gerwali guards and rush the officer. The Indian neutral chairman in the tent, Capt. Garaya, looked inquiringly at the young officer. The Communist saw the look, interpreted it, replied with a little shrug of resignation and started to sit down. By sheer force of passion the prisoner, dragging his guards with him, kicked viciously at the little table, and sent it hurling into the Communist’s lap. Then the Gurwalis lifted him off the floor and carried him bodily out of the tent, still screaming and cursing. The interview had lasted nearly 40 seconds.

The next prisoner was led in, struggling and sullen, and Garaya read the required preliminaries through his interpreter. The tall, slender lieutenant stood up, placed his fingers on the small green table, and leaned forward toward the prisoner. "Tung-moo…" he began, "comrade…" The prisoner remained silent, struggling against the Gurwalis’ arms. "Tung-moo," the Communist repeated. "As a representative of the government of the republic I can guarantee your personal safety on my own word. You are safe now, and free if you go home now." The young prisoner surged forward in his guards’ arms. "I don’t want to be repatriated—I want to stay in South Korea!"

The North Korean officer did not even seem to hear him. "You must think how great the grief of your father and mother will be if they cannot see you," he went on, his voice quivering with emotion. "How would they feel when they come to die and you are not there to bury them? How will they feel?" The prisoner only struggles harder, looks appealing at Garaya and pleads, "Let me go—I don’t want to be repatriated."

It is now 9:51 a.m., just six minutes after the interview began. The lieutenant is shaking with emotion—for all the world like an evangelist preaching for the soul of a sinner. His eyes burn and his voice rises and falls as he brings every emotion into play against the stubborn resistance in front of him. Every time the officer stops for breath and it is not often—the poor fellow shouts and struggles with the Gurwalis.

SHOUTS REFUSAL TO RETURN. At 9:58 a.m. – "I don’t want to be repatriated!", he shouts. At 10:04 a.m. – "I refuse to return!" At 10:13 a.m. – He whimpers and squirms in his guards’ grasp. At 10:15 – "I want to go back to my compound!" At 10:20 – "I don’t want to go back!" At 10:21 the Communist breaks the rules and threatens, "You must come back—you know that the people’s republic will occupy the southern half of Korea…"

Garaya’s hand slaps down and he barks at the wildly raving Communist to stop. "Tell him that he will not use this threatening language." At 10:25 the prisoner shouts, "I don’t want to go back," and tries to break for the door, but the Gurwalis hold. At 10:37 more than an hour after the interview began, the weary prisoner turns pleadingly to Garaya. "I have listened to the explanations and I have said I want to go out that door to South Korea. Can I go now?" But Garaya explains the rules—he must listen until the Reds are finished or until it is hopeless in the eyes of the NNRC committee present. The poor prisoner moans and slumps back in the guard’s arms. At 10:50 Garaya calls a five-minute recess to sound the opinion of his committee members. At 10:55 the session resumes, the incredible Communist, his voice not even hoarse, picking up where he left off.

EVERYONE BORED OR ASHAMED. Everyone in the room is bored or ashamed. The Swede has his face in his hands. The Swiss looks more owl-like than ever and smiles vaguely. Garaya smiles faintly from time to time himself. The Czech coughs. The Pole exhales long puffs of cigarette smoke. The prisoner struggles no longer—sits down and listens with head held low.

Finally, at 11:15—one hour and 28 minutes from the beginning—the prisoner surges to his feet and shouts violent: "I refuse to go." The spell is broken. "I have listened to the explanations. Now I want to go out of that door"—and he points south. Garaya looks at the Communist and asks, "Have you finished?" The orator and his two brother officers face reality, and nod. The prisoner, dazed but shaking, was led back to his compound. The Communist, never showing one line of disappointment on his face, sits down, impassive.

Five minutes later, they bring in another prisoner. The slender Communist stood up, placed his fingers on the small green field table and leaned toward the prisoner. "Tung-moo…" he began…

PANMUNJOM, Korea, Nov. 12 (INS)

A subcommittee of the Neutral Nations Repatriations Commission today begins the task of drafting a letter notifying the Allies and the Communists that explanations to anti-Communist war prisoners are for all practical purposes ended.

The NNRC appointed the subcommittee yesterday after the Communists for the sixth day insisted on interviewing balky Chinese prisoners who have refused to leave their compound for the explanations. Lt. Gen. K.S. Thimayya, Indian chairman of the NNRC, suggested as an alternative to the explanation program that the balky prisoners who have refused repatriation be screened one by one to either confirm their choice or change their minds.

An NNRC spokesman said it was "obvious" that explanations were at an end unless the Reds gave up their demand for prisoners from Compound C-22. The prisoners from C-22 have refused to leave their compound since last Friday when 136 from among them were interviewed by Communist persuaders.

HARASSED, COERCED. The prisoners charged they were "harassed and coerced" in lengthy interviews with Red officers. Yesterday the Communists renewed their demand that the prisoners be removed from the compound by force if necessary but the NNRC turned down again this proposal.

A propaganda broadcast by Peiping Radio blamed Allied "agents" in the compound for the breakdown in explanations. The broadcast also assailed Swiss members of the commission for "cooperation with the agents." The Swiss have consistently opposed use of force on the balky PWs.

The full commission will not meet again until 10 a.m. tomorrow when presumably the subcommittee will be finished with the work of drafting its letter on the explanations. The commission at its meeting yesterday also authorized another Indian court-martial to try seven Chinese prisoners for the alleged murder of a fellow inmate.

SEOUL, Jan. 21 (Pac. S&S)

Some 10,000 communism hating former soldiers of Red China’s "Volunteer" Army sailed toward Formosa in closely-guarded LSTs today on the last lap of their hard-fought race to freedom. Another six LSTs were standing by at the port of Inchon to take on the remainder of the almost 15,000 anti-Red Chinese released yesterday by the Indians. It was uncertain whether all of them would sail today due to changing tides in the harbor.

Meanwhile, at Panmunjom, "Operation Comeback" quietly wrapped itself up early this morning when the last group of anti-Red PWs marched through the checkpoints and boarded south-bound trucks. At Pohang, 1,000 laughing and singing North Korean PWs, who renounced communism, arrived at 3:10 a.m. to be greeted by thousands of South Korean citizens who braved the cold rain to witness the historic occasion.

An NNRC official at Panmunjom said the final convoy of men was released at 12:55 a.m. Only 104 Chinese and North Koreans changed their minds at the last minute and asked for repatriation out of a total 21,771 non-repatriates who elected to excuse themselves from Communist domination.

Ten LSTs carrying the Chinese to Formosa are being escorted by American fighter planes and warships. The first shipload was slated to reach the Formosan port of Keelung Sunday morning port authorities said. The now-captive Chinese …. [unreadable]…. Step off the ships as civilians after the release deadline is reached at midnight Friday. The fleet of LSTs slit into groups of five when they reached high seas and an American destroyer was assigned to each group. A security force of U.s. Marines is aboard each craft. Officials said more than 200 Chinese and North Korean PWs still were in the hands of the Indians. The group includes the 104 last-minute repatriates, 93 who seek to go to neutral nations, eight on trail for murder, plus some witnesses.

13,915 PROCESSED. A spokesman at the collecting point near Munsan announced a total of 13,945 Chinese had come through the center. A hospital train carried out another 264. The grand total of 14,209 Chinese the U.N. said it has received was 18 under the Indian figure given to Allied officers. The spokesman said the error could have been made in counting on either side.

At Pohang welcoming addresses by South Korean officials had been postponed early today because of rain. The former North Korean soldiers, number 7,574, were to be divided into two groups, those wishing to become civilians and those wishing to join the ROK Army.



24 December 1953

SUBJECT: Letter of Appreciation

TO: Commanding General
United Nations Command Repatriation Group

The completion of the explanation period to the prisoners of war on 23 December marks the end of a truly unique operation in our military history. It has been the major responsibility of the United Nations Command Repatriation Group to guide this critical undertaking in wisdom, restraint and discretion. On behalf of the entire United Nations Command, I wish to express my personal appreciation to you and your personnel for the manner in which your organization has fulfilled its mission. I am fully aware of the many difficulties which you have successfully overcome and it has been a source of deep satisfaction to me to observe the able, enthusiastic devotion to duty which has marked the performance of your group.

Please express my thanks to each member of your command, with my best wishes for the holiday season.

John E. Hull, General
USA Commanding

Headquarters, UNC Repatriation Group, APO 72, 24 December 1953

TO: Each Member of UNCREG and Its Allied Assistants

I am proud of the behavior and grateful for the service which each of you has performed. You have merited the high praise which the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command, has bestowed upon you. I join him in extending best wishes and seasons greetings.

A.L. Hamblen, Brigadier General
USA Commanding

Photo Gallery...

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Munroe Documents


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When Gerry Munroe of Falmouth, Massachusetts, visited the Korean War Educator, she noticed that the UNCREG section of the United Nations Involvement page did not contain some of the documents which were in her husband’s possession at the time of his death. 1st Lt. Robert S. Munroe was an Observer with Chinese Team 916. (Note the UNCREG armband and file folder in this picture of Munroe, taken at the time he was 24 years old and serving in Korea.) Our thanks to Gerry for sending a copy of the Temporary Agreement Supplementary to the Armistice Agreement, the letter from "Anti-Red Prisoners", debriefing documents, and the photo of her late husband.

Temporary Agreement Supplementary to the Armistice Agreement

In order to meet the requirements of the disposition of the prisoners of war not for direct repatriation in accordance with the provisions of the Terms of Reference for Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, on the one hand, and the Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army and the Commander of the Chinese People’s Volunteers, on the other hand, in pursuance of the provisions in Paragraph 61, Article V of the Agreement concerning a military armistice in Korea, agree to conclude the following Temporary Agreement supplementary to the Armistice agreement:

  1. Under the provisions of Paragraphs 4 and 5, Article II of the Terms of Reference for Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, the United Nations Command has the right to designate the area between the Military Demarcation Line and the eastern and southern boundaries of the Demilitarized Zone between the Imjin River on the south and the road leading south from Okum-ni on the northeast (the main road leading southeast from Panmunjom not included), as the area within which the United Nations Command will turn over the prisoners of war, who are not directly repatriated and whom the United Nations Command has the responsibility for keeping under its custody, to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and the armed forces of India for custody. The United Nations Command shall, prior to the signing of the Armistice Agreement, inform the side of the Korean People’s Army and the Chinese People’s Volunteers of the approximate figures by nationality of such prisoners of war held in its custody.
  2. If there are prisoners of war under their custody who request not to be directly repatriated, the Korean People’s Army and the Chinese People’s Volunteers have the right to designate the area in the vicinity of Panmunjom between the Military Demarcation Line and the western and northern boundaries of the Demilitarized Zone, as the area within which such prisoners of war will be turned over to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and the armed forces of India for custody. After knowing that there are prisoners of war under their custody who request not to be directly repatriated, the Korean People’s Army and the Chinese People’s Volunteers shall inform the United Nations Command side of the approximate figures by nationality of such prisoners of war.
  3. In accordance with Paragraphs 8, 9 and 10, Article I of the Armistice Agreement, the following paragraphs are hereby provided:
    1. After the cease-fire comes into effect, unarmed personnel of each side shall be specifically authorized by the Military Armistice Commission to enter the above-mentioned area designated by their own side to perform necessary construction operations. None of such personnel shall remain in the above-mentioned areas upon the completion of the construction operations.
    2. A definite number of prisoners of war as decided upon by both sides, who are in the respective custody of both sides and who are not directly repatriated, shall be specifically authorized by the Military Armistice Commission to be escorted respectively by a certain number of armed forces of the detaining sides to the above-mentioned areas of custody designated respectively by both sides to be turned over to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and the armed forces of India for custody. After the prisoners of war have been taken over, the armed forces of the detaining sides shall be withdrawn immediately from the areas of custody to the area under the control of their own side.
    3. The personnel of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and its subordinate bodies, the armed forces of India, the Red Cross Society of India, the explaining representatives and observation representatives of both sides, as well as the required material and equipment, for exercising the functions provided for in the Terms of Reference for Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall be specifically authorized by the Military Armistice Commission to have the complete freedom of movement to, from, and within the above-mentioned areas designated respectively by both sides for the custody of prisoners of war.
  4. The provisions of Sub-paragraph 3c of this agreement shall not be construed as derogating from the privileges enjoyed by those personnel mentioned above under Paragraph 11, Article I of the Armistice Agreement.
  5. This Agreement shall be abrogated upon the completion of the mission provided for in the Terms of Reference for Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission.

Done at Panmunjom, Korea, at 1000 hours on the 27th day of July, 1953, in English, Korean, and Chinese, all texts being equally authentic.


Kim Il Sung
Marshal, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Supreme Commander, Korean People’s Army

Peng Teh-Huai
Commander, Chinese People’s Volunteers

Mark W. Clark
General, United States Army, Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command


Nam IL, General, Korean People’s Army Senior Delegate, Delegation of the Korean People’s Army and the Chinese People’s Volunteers
William K. Harrison, Jr., Lieutenant General, United States Army, Senior Delegate, United Nations Command Delegation

Anti-Red Prisoners’ Letter
20 January 1954

[KWE Note: The following note is in broken English, and we did not attempt to correct it..]

Dear U.N. Honourable Fighters,

When the Reds bandits commenced an unprovoked assault against the territory of the Republic of Korea, you all heroes were left your home and voluntary to sustain the just war, and didn’t care any of self-sacrifices to halt the aggression of Reds in hot fightings. For these action you have sucessed the worship of all the people of the world and we’re respect of your resolute will to preserve the world peace fighter.

Now we’re very apologetic to you for that you’ve fighted more than nineteen months for us. But we wouldn’t forget it and we’ll remember it by our heart when we’re in the anti-Reds battle. By that time we can offer our only power of life to destroy the world aggressor for thank you.

Now the war was stop and we’ve liberated under the offense of U.N. We hope we’ll meet again in the anti-Reds fire line to struggle the happiness for human.

Our dear honourable heroes. Now our country-brothers were live under the tyranny of the Reds China so we’ve to leave now. Because we want immediately to releive our country-brothers. See again in the anti-Reds battle.

God bless you and hope you fight victoriously all the time.

Yours sincerely,
All the Anti-Red Prisoners

MPs Have Role in POW Repatriation
an undated news clipping

Officers and enlisted men of the Military Police Corps are playing an important part in the operations of the United Nations in the repatriation of Communist and UN prisoners of war.

MPs serving with UNCRED as observers are: Col. Edward H. Farr; Lt. Cols Philip H. Hill; Raymond E. Klein and Angel F. Bruno; Maj John M. Kiernan; Capts William B. Carpenter and Howard A. Gagnon; 1st Lt. Robert S. Munroe and 2nd Lt. Burt E. Winke.

Attached to UNCREG to perform patrol and escort duties is Co. B, 519th MP Bn. Its officers are 1st Lts. Hiawatha Smith, Harold Steward and Joseph R. Cruciani.

PIO of UNCREG is Lt. Col. Ralph E. Pearson, assisted by Maj. Peter A. Erickson as executive officer and 2nd Lt. William Homiak as senior liaison officer. 1st Lt. Daniel G. Scheuermann is CO, HQ Det., UNCREG.

At Headquarters, UN Command Military Armistice Commission, Maj Robert L. Huffaker is the provost marshal, Capt John R. Kettinger his assistant, and 1st Lt Charles E. Casey the operations officer.

As CO of the UN component Joint Security Det., Capt Edward G. Luce is responsible for MP activities in the Demilitarized Zone. His men escort representatives of the neutral nations and patrol the south portion of the zone.

Debriefing Procedure
Memorandum No. 26
20 October 1953

  1. Debriefing forms completed at the close of morning operations in the explanation area will be forwarded to the assistant Chief of Staff, G-2-3, by vehicle messenger. The senior officer present in Areas A and B will assure that all debriefing forms are turned in and complete as to detail.
  2. General observers will keep the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2-3, informed via telephone of all significant events occurring during the day. Sensitive matter will be sent by vehicle messenger.
  3. Afternoon debriefing forms will be completed within one hour after return from the explanation area, assembled by the Chief, Observer-Representative Section, and forwarded to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2-3, as expeditiously as possible.
  4. Officers selected to survey the debriefing forms and collate the material therefrom will report to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2-3, at 1400 daily and remain until all information has been collated.
  5. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2-3, will receive all messages from the explaining area during the day’s operations and compile all pertinent information in SITREP form, paragraphing information on separate papers for each paragraph, as well as indicating major SITREP paragraph designation.
  6. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2-3, will complete by 2030 daily a clear draft of SITREP for presentation to the senior observers and the Chief of Staff.
  7. If the Commanding General calls a meeting of section chiefs and general observers, he may wish to add one or more paragraphs to paragraph "e" of the SITREP as a result of the additional information obtained.

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